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Abstract—With the rise of cheap small-cells in wireless cellular
networks, there are new opportunities for third party providers to
service local regions via sharing arrangements with traditional
operators. In fact, such arrangements are highly desirable for
large facilities—such as stadiums, universities, and mines—as
they already need to cover property costs, and often have fibre
backhaul and efficient power infrastructure. In this paper, we
propose a new network sharing arrangement between large
facilities and traditional operators. Our facility network sharing
arrangement consists of two aspects: leasing of core network
access and spectrum from traditional operators; and service
agreements with users. Importantly, our incorporation of a user
service agreement into the arrangement means that resource
allocation must account for financial as well as physical resource
constraints. This introduces a new non-trivial dimension into
wireless network resource allocation, which requires a new
evaluation framework—the data rate is no longer the only
main performance metric. Moreover, despite clear economic
incentives to adopt network sharing for facilities, a business
case is lacking. As such, we develop a general socio-technical
evaluation framework based on ruin-theory, where the key metric
for the sharing arrangement is the probability that the facility
has less than zero revenue surplus. We then use our framework to
evaluate our facility network sharing arrangement, which offers
guidance for leasing and service agreement negotiations, as well
as design of the wireless network architecture, taking into account
network revenue streams.
Index Terms—
network sharing, facilities, ruin theory
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional wireless networks, expensive infrastructure
and the rapid adoption of new radio technologies resulted
in small numbers of new market entrants. More recently,
sharing of the radio access network (RAN) has been adopted
to reduce capital expenditures (including infrastructure) of new
operators, while still offering wide coverage and high quality
of service (QoS). This trend has encouraged new operators
to enter the market and sophisticated arrangements between
infrastructure owners and operators are being considered.
There are many possible network sharing arrangements
for wireless cellular network infrastructure, including mast
sharing, full RAN sharing, roaming, or core-network sharing.
At present, the most common sharing arrangements have
involved only the RAN [1], which allows operators to pool
resources and can increase the capacity available for operators
to service regions that already have high base station (BS)
density or to improve coverage to under-served areas in
developing regions. A common RAN sharing arrangement is
based on companies that only offer base stations to operators
(known as tower companies), which are now a large part of the
wireless industry; particularly in India and the United States.
In other regions, established operators have heavily invested
in infrastructure and negotiated BS sharing arrangements with
new entrants to the market, such as in Sweden. Ultimately,
these approaches can be viewed as the first steps towards
the dynamic market-based “networks without borders” vision
where resources including spectrum, RANs and core networks
are pooled, with contributors ranging from individuals to
traditional operators [2].
In parallel with the adoption of network sharing, small-cell
technology (also known as femto, micro, pico, or metro-cells
depending on the provider and transmitting capabilities) is
revolutionizing the wireless industry with cheap, low-power
base stations [3]. By exploiting small-cells, wireless networks
can offer high data rates with a small footprint via dense
placement, which reduces the distance between the small-cell
and the user—the most effective means of increasing network
capacity [4].
Despite the success of current network sharing arrangements
and small-cells, there remain complex issues to be resolved.
In particular, property must be leased to anchor small-cells,
and backhaul must be installed in order to implement network
MIMO (including CoMP) as well as inter-cell interference
coordination (eICIC) [5]—key techniques for the effective
operation of small-cell networks. Moreover, operational ex-
penditures (OpEx)—largely due to small-cell maintenance—
are growing with the increasing number of small-cells in the
network. This increase in OpEx will continue until effective
self-organizing network (SON) technologies [6] are success-
fully implemented.
A particularly challenging scenario for operators is large
facilities with high data rate demands, even when standard
network sharing arrangements are employed. Common exam-
ples of these facilities are universities, stadiums, convention
centers, utilities, mines, and high density urban residences.
The challenge arises due to the high cost in leasing small-cell
locations, cost of leasing high bandwidth backhaul (despite
the fact that the backhaul is often available within these
facilities via fibre links), the often unusual characteristics of
user demands—such as high upload rates in stadiums [7]—
2and large variations in data rate demand over time. Moreover,
large facilities may desire to only charge low rates to users in
order to improve the operation of the facility; in stark contrast
with standard wireless service arrangements. This can occur
either because the users are employees and the mobile service
is paid for by the facility, or a cheap mobile service is used as
an attraction to the facility; similar to how WiFi is currently
offered free of charge to users in many convention centers and
hotels.
A. A New Socio-Technical Network Sharing Approach
There is strong motivation for large facilities to offer cheap
mobile services and to develop their own capability to do so;
namely, the low cost of small-cells, and the availability of high
bandwidth backhaul. As such, there is a genuine need for an
alternative network sharing arrangement that can exploit the
unique characteristics of large facilities.
In this paper, we propose a new network sharing arrange-
ment for facilities. Our facility network sharing arrangement
is based on a network consisting of small-cells operated by
and within the facility, which contrasts with tower companies
that own multiple small-cells and BSs, which are leased to
operators.
There are two key aspects to our facility network sharing
arrangement: the core network leasing agreement between
traditional operators and the facility; and the service agreement
between the facility and users. The purpose of the core network
leasing agreement is to provide the facility with data to serve
users that are subscribed to traditional operators as well as
spectrum localized to the facility. This agreement involves a
fee that the facility pays to the traditional operator, in exchange
for core network access and spectrum. On the other hand,
the service agreement is the mechanism by which the facility
obtains revenue. In particular, the facility charges users for
its services; depending on the resources required to ensure
reliable transmission, and also pricing parameters designed to
compensate for the leasing fee for core network access.
In concept, our facility network sharing arrangement bears
similarities to the “local network operated by an independent
actor” classification for indoor cellular networks proposed in
[8]. More specifically, the approach in [8] introduced the
notion of third party operators to service users inside large
buildings, which negotiate with traditional operators for data
access. Our facility network sharing arrangement differs in two
key aspects: (i) we are not limited to indoor operation, which
is achieved using a general stochastic geometry model that can
in principle be extended to include small-cell cooperation via
eICIC techniques; and (ii) we propose a specific agreement
structure between operators, users, and facilities. In particular,
core network access is provided via a new leasing arrangement
that can in principle be formulated as a contractual obligation,
which we detail in Section III.
While facilities have currently not been considered within
a network sharing arrangement, there are six key economic
incentives, subject to the presence of appropriate antitrust
regulation: (1) the facility already owns or leases the property,
which means that there is zero sunk cost for positioning small-
cells; (2) the facility’s high bandwidth fibre network can be
exploited at no additional cost to provide high rates through
advanced eICIC; (3) competition will be increased between
traditional operators in the region through core network access
costs (in contrast with RAN discrimination); (4) users will
be charged only at the facility’s incremental costs as the
facility is either covering the costs itself (e.g., in mines or
utilities) or the service is offered as an attraction (e.g. in
hotels or convention centers); (5) facilities can offer more
efficient power sources as they also must power the facility
(e.g., through large-scale solar cell sources); and (6) SON
innovation is promoted as the facilities chase a reduced OpEx.
An incremental approach to SON is also possible since the
facilities will have a relatively small number of small-cells,
which means that there are fewer complexities compared with
the large-scale RANs of traditional operators.
These benefits clearly suggest that there is a significant
potential for network sharing arrangements involving facilities.
B. Evaluation of Facility Network Sharing Arrangements
Although there are clear economic incentives for the adop-
tion of facility network sharing arrangements, a business case
based on a quantitative framework is lacking. We address
this issue by evaluating facility network sharing using a new
framework, which incorporates both the wireless communica-
tions network, as well as the service and leasing agreements
between users, the facility, and traditional wireless operators
that own the core networks. In contrast with standard analytical
frameworks in the wireless communications literature, our
framework models the facility as a socio-technical system. This
means that the conclusions arising from our framework lie
close to those used directly in real-world practice. Moreover,
our framework is general, which means that it can be adapted
to a range of wireless settings, where resource sharing is used
and financial sustainability is a key design criterion.
Profit-based approaches for resource allocation in cellular
networks have been considered in [9]–[14]. Early work on
capacity pricing adapted a real options framework to cope
with uncertainties [14]. In [9], [13], cognitive cellular net-
works and small-cell networks, respectively, were modeled
via Stackelberg games. The approach in [13] employed sub-
sidies to incentivize closed access small-cell access points to
share allocated spectrum. The approaches in [11], [12] also
exclusively focused on spectrum allocation. In [10] the BS
density and spectrum usage were optimized to maximize the
net profit; however, this analysis was based solely on long-
term average rates. The drawback of such an approach is
that it does not consider any assessment of the feasibility of
the business model nor optimal solutions obtained from the
perspective of a financial risk management analysis. As such, it
is not easy to assess the long-term profitability of the operator.
This is important as network design that takes profitability
into account will differ from standard designs under purely
technical constraints and generally lead to improved operator
longevity. Key parameters such as compounded interest rates,
initial capital, expenditures, and future investments also can-
not be incorporated into the standard approaches. Moreover,
previous work does not account for the effect of fluctuations
in the number of users and their cellular data demands.
3Jointly addressing a number of the key financial and
technical factors that arise in real-world cellular networks
(including features such as channel gains, power control,
path loss and the duration of user connections), is crucial to
reliably predicting and optimizing the financial sustainability
of network sharing arrangements. However, this requires a
more sophisticated socio-technical framework. In this paper,
we propose a new quantitative framework to evaluate facility
network sharing arrangements based on a reformulation of ruin
theory1 [15] to facilitate a study of business models, where the
key performance metric is the probability that the owner of
the facility has a negative revenue surplus within a period of
n months—leading to financial insolvency. We emphasize that
the probability of these events, termed ruin, is dependent on
both economic and technical factors, which include: the initial
capital of the facility; the compound interest rate (compounded
monthly); link parameters, such as channel gains, power
control and path loss; duration of user connections; and the
number of users in the network.
C. Key Contributions
We summarize our three key contributions as follows.
1) We propose a new network sharing arrangement between
traditional operators, facilities, and users. The arrange-
ments accounts for both the expenditures and revenue for
the facility, which arise due to the cost of leasing access
to traditional operators’ core networks (expenditures), and
the income from servicing users normally subscribed to
traditional operators (revenue). Importantly, the service
charges incurred by each user depend on the physical
resources required to ensure reliable transmission. As
such, the service charges are strongly coupled to the
capabilities of the RAN.
2) We develop a quantitative ruin theory-based framework to
evaluate facility network sharing. The evaluation is based
on the probability of ruin; that is, the probability that
there is a negative revenue surplus within a period of n
months (a standard metric for financial risk analysis [15]).
In order to obtain the probability of ruin, we:
a) Derive the moments of the revenue from user service
charges, based on a practical wireless heterogeneous
network model. In particular, we exploit stochastic
geometry techniques [16] to model the placement of
base stations and users.
b) Use the moments of the revenue time-varying stochas-
tic process to compute the probability distribution
of the net profit derived by the facility operator by
incorporating revenue from the service of each user.
c) Compute the probability of ruin via the probability dis-
tribution of the net profit and efficient recursions (based
on linear difference equations), which are motivated
by results in insurance theory [17], [18]. Importantly,
we extend the applicability of the standard recursions
account for idiosyncratic (from the perspective of in-
surance) aspects of wireless communication networks.
1Historically, ruin theory originally arose in the study of solvency require-
ments for insurance [15].
3) We evaluate facility network sharing based on numerical
evaluation of the probability of ruin via our framework.
First, we demonstrate that facility network sharing can
be profitable. Second, we provide insights to guide the
design of wireless networks to account for revenue and
expenditures, in addition to ensuring reliable transmis-
sion.
II. WIRELESS NETWORK MODEL
In this section, we detail the wireless networking aspects of
our model for the facility (financial aspects will be discussed
in Section III). The key aspects that we consider are the
placement of the small-cells, which small-cell a given user
will connect to, and the physical layer transmission model.
We note that our modeling assumptions are based on previous
approaches to wireless cellular networks (see e.g., [19]) and
the only significant difference is that the scale of facilities are
typically smaller than those considered for standard networks.
Our assumptions for small-cell placement and the user
selection protocol are as follows:
A1: The facility’s small-cells are arranged according to a
homogeneous spatial Poisson point process (PPP) with
intensity β. This means that in each realization there is
a different number of small-cells, which provides insight
into the behavior of the network irrespective of how the
small-cells are positioned.
A2: All users serviced by the facility:
(i) connect to the nearest facility small-cell;
(ii) are arranged according to an independent stationary
point process, not necessarily Poisson.
The key consequence of assumptions (A1) and (A2) is that
the distribution of the distance R of a small-cell and any user
it services is given by [19, Section III-A]
Pr(Z ≤ z) = e−βpiz
2
2pizβ. (1)
We now detail our assumptions for the physical layer
transmission model.
A3: The facility’s small-cell network operates in discrete time
with block fading. Each time slot (also corresponding to
a fading block), has a duration (coherence time) of T
seconds.
A4: Each small-cell interferes with the others. Due to the
Poisson interference assumption (A1), the interference is
M/M shot noise [19]. As such, the received signal in
the l-th time slot (l = 1, 2, . . .) of a user’s connection is
given by
yl = hl
√
r−αU P0xl + nl + zl, (2)
where hl ∼ CN (0, 1) are the independent fading coeffi-
cients for time slots l, and rU is the distance between
the user and its small-cell (the closest one, by (A2)),
distributed according to (1). P0 is the power level the
small-cell transmits at; not necessarily constant. α is the
path loss exponent, xl ∼ CN (0, 1) is the (Gaussian) data
symbol, and nl ∼ CN (0, σ2) is additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN), with noise variance σ2. zl is the M/M
shot noise.
4Based on assumption (A4), the instantaneous signal-to-
interference and noise ratio (SINR) in the l-th time slot of
a given user’s connection is given by
γl =
|hl|2r
−α
U P0
σ2 + Il
, (3)
where Il is the interference power in the l-th time slot of
the connection. In our analysis, we focus on the interference
limited scenario where σ2 = 0.
The achievable data rate in each time slot under Gaussian
signaling for a user in the l-th slot of her connection is given
by
Rmaxl = B log2(1 + γl), (4)
where B is the bandwidth (a constant) and γl is given by (3).
III. PROPOSED NETWORK SHARING ARRANGEMENT
In this section, we introduce our network sharing arrange-
ment between the facility, users, and traditional operators
(which have their own core networks). It is important to
consider traditional operators as their core networks are a key
source of data for the facility’s small-cell network as well
as spectrum. Although it is also possible to obtain data from
the internet (although not necessarily calls), when there are a
significant number of users this can consume a large amount of
bandwidth and may also require special agreements with ISPs.
As such, we focus on the scenario where traditional operators
provide data via their core networks.
Our network sharing arrangement consists of two compo-
nents: a leasing agreement with traditional operators; and a
service agreement with users, which is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The agreements determine financial exchanges (contractual
obligations) between the facility, users, and the traditional
operators. Moreover, these exchanges induce revenue and
expenditure processes that are stochastic due to uncertainties
in the resources required to provide the service (due to the
stochastic nature of the wireless channel) and the random
duration of the users’ connections. To this end, we formalize
these processes which forms the basis of our evaluation
framework in Section IV.
Users Facility Micronetwork Traditional 
Operator
Core Networks
Service 
Agreement
Leasing
Agreement
Fig. 1. Network sharing arrangement diagram.
A. Leasing and Service Agreements
A leasing agreement between the facility and a traditional
operator allows the facility to access the data required by users
it seeks to service. In the leasing agreement, the facility pays a
fee to the traditional operator in return for access to their core
network and spectrum localized to the facility. A key feature
of our leasing agreement is that the facility pays a fee per
connection. This means that the facility only pays for access
it actually requires, which is consistent with the broader vision
of dynamic wireless network sharing proposed in [2].
We assume that the fee is only determined by the traditional
operator that is providing the service; that is, it is independent
of other factors such as the duration of the connection. As
users are typically subscribed to a single operator, this means
that the fee for each user may be different. Our leasing
agreement is summarized as follows.
Our proposed core network leasing agreement between
traditional operators and the facility consists of the con-
nection fee for the j-th user. The connection fee is given
by
C(τi,j , ki,j) = C
∗(ki,j), (5)
where C∗(ki,j) is the connection fee for users subscribed
to operator ki,j .
Observe that the leasing agreement does not depend on the
duration of each connection. As each core network typically
has a large number of connections at any given time, it is
likely that the distribution of the number and duration of
each connection is known to the corresponding traditional
operator. Moreover, the infrastructure required to support a
given connection is also known due to the stability of the
wired links (as opposed to the wireless scenario). In this case,
the operator can obtain good estimates of equilibrium prices
required to ensure that profit targets are met, which means
that the duration of each connection does not play a key role.
However, when there is a scarcity of access to the core network
then it is necessary to consider connection durations in the fee,
which may be achieved via a market mechanism such as an
auction.
We now consider the service agreement between the facility
and each user. The basis of the service agreement is that there
is a cost to the facility to provide users with the wireless
service. The cost depends on four key factors: (i) the traditional
wireless operator that the user has a subscription; (ii) the
duration of the users connection to the facility; (iii) the quality
of the wireless service requested (i.e., the rate at which the
user requests to be serviced); and (iv) the SINR of the link
between the user and the facility small-cell that it is serviced
by. Importantly, all of these factors are random quantities.
The service agreement corresponds to the revenue the
facility receives in exchange for servicing each user, which
can be obtained from two sources. The first source is directly
from the users; that is, the users pay the facility for the use
of the service. In this case, the users pay the facility for every
5connection they require. The second source is the facility itself.
In this case, the facility subsidizes the users and the agreement
corresponds to the funds the facility allocates to cover the cost
of servicing each user, which is applicable when the facility is
providing the service for its employees or when the service is
an attraction (e.g., for hotels or stadiums). Again, this is on a
per connection basis, which means that users (or the facility)
only pay for the connections that they actually use.
We assume that the service provider offers Q products of
varying QoS. In practice, the user selects an application that it
seeks to use—such as voice, video, or data—and the service
provider offers a QoS product that can support the application.
Remark 1 (User indexing notation). In a given time slot,
multiple users are likely to conclude their connection. To refer
to a given user, we index it by the pair (i, j), where i is
the time slot that the user concludes its connection and j is
the index of the user in the set of users that conclude their
connection in time slot i. For example, when a user is the 4-th
user that terminates its connection in time slot 5, then the user
is indexed as (5, 4).
In order to provide increasing levels of QoS over the
wireless link, the facility is required to employ an increas-
ing number of physical resources; for instance, additional
bandwidth, power, or infrastructure (e.g. relays or distributed
antennas). It is important to note that a different number of
physical resources are usually required in each time slot to
account for channel fading. As such, the facility varies the
SINR in each time slot by a scaling factor ci,j,l (corresponding
to the l-th time slot of the connection for the (i, j)-th user) to
achieve
R
(q)
i,j = B log (1 + γi,j,lci,j,l) , (6)
where R(q)i,j corresponds to the rate required to support QoS
product q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q} for user (i, j) and ci,j,l encapsulates
the additional physical resources required to support QoS
product q. Observe that (6) follows directly from (4) with γl
replaced with γi,j,l, which clarifies the particular user that is
serviced. While it might seem more natural to directly scale
the rate (i.e. define R(q) = Bc′i,j,l log(1 + γi,j,l)), it is in
fact simpler to use our formulation. We will show this in
Section IV, where we develop our evaluation framework based
on ruin theory. It is also worthwhile to note that the two
formulations are identical with the appropriate definition of
c′i,j,l.
In practice, the facility’s physical resources are limited. As
such, the scaling factor ci,j,l is upper bounded by a constant.
We also introduce a lower bound on ci,j,l so that the facility
is guaranteed a minimum income, even when the channel
is good. This means that facility can ensure that it can pay
the core network leasing fee, detailed in (8). Taking these
considerations into account, we define ci,j,l as
ci,j,l = max
{
min
{
2R
(q)
i,j /B − 1
γi,j,l
, cmax
}
, cmin
}
. (7)
It is also necessary to account for the duration of each user’s
connection. In particular, we make the following assumptions:
A5: Let τi,j be the duration (in integer time slots) of the
connection of the j-th user to end its connection in
the i-th time slot; i.e user (i, j). Each duration τi,j is
independent and identically distributed. The durations τi,j
has CDF Fτi,j with support {1, 2, . . . , i}.
We now detail our proposed service agreement.
Our proposed service agreement consists of the charge
to the j-th user to end its connection in the i-th time slot
(user (i, j)), which is given by
v(τi,j , ci,j) =
τi,j∑
l=1
ci,j,lTρ, (8)
where ci,j = [ci,j,1, . . . , ci,j,τi,j ]T is the vector of scaling
factors (each element corresponding to a different time
slot) to satisfy (6) and ρ is the premium rate; that is,
the income received from user (i, j) by the facility per
time slot with a unit scaling factor. We assume that the
premium rate ρ is constant, irrespective of the operator
that user (i, j) is subscribed to.
B. Summary of the Proposed Network Sharing Arrangement
From the perspective of the facility, the leasing agreement
corresponds to an expenditure process and the service agree-
ment corresponds to an income process. As such, our network
sharing arrangement can be formalized as a revenue surplus
process, which is defined in terms of the expenditure and
income processes.
An important feature of the revenue surplus process is that
interest is compounded. This means that the total revenue
surplus is dependent on not only the current surplus, revenue
and costs, but also the interest rate. Moreover, the time interval
between interest compounding is typically different to the
duration of a time slot. The number of users with connections
ending in compound interest interval m is given in (A6).
A6: The number of users Nn that have their connection end
in compound interest interval [n − 1, n) of duration κT
(κ ∈ N) is geometrically distributed as
Pr(Ni = u) = (1− wN )
uwN . (9)
We first formalize the facility expenditure process, which
is based on the core network leasing agreement with the
traditional operators.
Definition 1 (Facility Expenditure Process). Consider the
(i, j)-th user associated with the k-th wireless operator, which
has:
(i) a random connection duration τi,j time intervals, dis-
tributed according to τi,j ∼ Fτi,j (detailed in (A6));
(ii) a requested rate product R(q)i,j with q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Q},
distributed according to R(q)i,j ∼ FRi,j for any discrete
distribution on {1, 2, . . . , Q};
(iii) and required resources ci,j = [ci,j,1, . . . , ci,j,τi,j ]T , which
are i.i.d random variables defined in (7).
6Then the total expenditure of the facility in the compound
interest interval [n− 1, n) is given by
En =
Nn∑
j=1
C(τm,j , km,j), (10)
where (n − 1)κT ≤ m < nκT are the time slots that end
in interval [n− 1, n), and Nn is geometrically distributed (as
detailed in (A6)) and C(τn,j , kn,j) is defined in (8).
Next, we formalize the facility income process, which is
based on the service agreement with the users.
Definition 2 (Facility Income Process). Consider the (i, j)-th
user associated with the k-th wireless operator, which satisfies
the hypotheses in Definition 1. Then, the proposed charge to
the (i, j)-th user (corresponding to the facility income) for
connecting to the facility for a duration τi,j is given by the
compound random sum
v(τi,j , ci,j) =
τi,j∑
l=1
ci,j,lTρ. (11)
The total income generated in the period [n − 1, n) is given
by
In =
Nn∑
j=1
v(τm,j , cm,j), (12)
where (n − 1)κT ≤ m < nκT are the time slots that end
in interval [n− 1, n), and Nn is geometrically distributed, as
detailed in (A7).
Finally, the revenue surplus process for the facility is defined
as follows. This can be viewed as the accumulation of the
initial capital and the difference between the income and
expenditure processes, taking into account compound interest.
Definition 3. The revenue surplus is the current micro-network
profit in the l-th time slot generated by serving users, after
accounting for interest and the cost of accessing the operators’
core networks. This is given by
Sl(u) = u(1 + r)
l +
l∑
i=1
(1 + r)l−i
Ni∑
j=1
[
v(τmi,j , cmi,j)
−C(τmi,j , kmi,j)
]
, (13)
where iκT ≤ mi < (i+1)κT , u is the facility’s initial capital
and r is the compound interest rate (compounded at intervals
of κT ). We also define
Snet(i) =
Ni∑
j=1
[v(τm,j , cm,j)− C(τm,j , km,j)] , (14)
as the net profit in compound interval i, where iκT ≤ m <
(i+ 1)κT .
It is important to note that there is potentially a significant
difference in the time scales at which users are priced (order
of minutes) and that the revenue surplus is calculated (order
of months).
IV. EVALUATION FRAMEWORK: A RUIN THEORY
APPROACH
In this section, we detail our framework to evaluate our
facility network sharing arrangement, which will be evaluated
in Section V. Our framework is based on ruin theory [15],
where the key performance metric is the probability that the
facility has a negative revenue surplus within n months, known
as the probability of ruin. This is an important metric as the
facility can only operate while it has the resources to do so.
In fact, knowing whether these financial resources are likely
to be available is important in the decision of whether or not
to invest in the facility, how to structure products, and how
much to charge for services.
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward to directly compute
the probability of ruin. The main reason for this is that the
income and expenditure processes (defined in Section III-B)
involve a number of random variables, which result in random
sums without closed-form distributions. Due to these difficul-
ties, we instead focus on obtaining an accurate approximation
of the probability of ruin.
Fortunately, we are able to leverage techniques from ruin
theory to compute an accurate approximation for the proba-
bility of facility ruin. However, it is important to note that
modifications to the standard theory are required, due to
the fact that the parameters of facilities yield non-standard
distributions.
In this section, there are four subsections: (A) the definition
and overview of the key steps to compute the facility ruin
probability; (B) the first step: the approximation of the income
distribution, which is based on an orthogonal polynomial
representation; (C) the second step: the recursion for the net
profit distribution; and (D) The third step: the recursion for
the probability of ruin.
A. Ruin Probability Definition and Overview
Intuitively, the probability of ruin is the probability that the
revenue surplus is negative before a period of l time periods
(e.g., months). First, we define the stopping time known as
the time of ruin, followed by the ruin probability.
Definition 4 (Ruin Time). The time of ruin is the first time
that the revenue surplus is negative, i.e.
LR = inf{l : Sl(u) < 0}, (15)
where u is the initial capital. Note that we allow for the
possibility that u < 0.
Definition 5 (Probability of Ruin). The probability of ruin
before a period of l time periods is then
ψl(u) = Pr(LR ≤ l), (16)
and the probability of survival is
φl(u) = 1− ψl(u). (17)
In order to compute the ruin probability; the steps are
detailed in Algorithm 1.
7Algorithm 1 Ruin Probability Computation
1. Derive the orthogonal polynomial basis expansion for the
income PDF in Section IV-B.
2. Evaluate the distribution for the net profit in time slot l
in Section IV-C. This is achieved by first discretizing the
income PDF from Section IV-B, then using a recursion from
actuarial science to compute the compound distribution.
3. Evaluate the probability of ruin via another recursion in
Section IV-D (different to the recursion in Stage 2), which
circumvents the difficulty of directly computing the proba-
bility of ruin.
B. Orthogonal Polynomial Representation of the Income PDF
The first stage of computing the probability of ruin is to
compute the PDF of the income from a user with connection
ending in time slot i, which from Definition 2 is given by
Vi = v(τi,j , ci,j) =
τi,j∑
l=1
ci,j,lTρ, (18)
which is a random sum due to τi,j and ci,j,l (given in (7)).
Remark 2. In general, the distribution of τi,j depends on
i. For short compounding intervals this is to ensure that the
connection duration is not longer than the time the system has
been running. In other cases, the distribution may vary due
to seasonal usage trends and events, such as holidays. This
has the important consequence that the moments and hence
distribution of Vi depend on the time slot i that user (i, j)’s
connection ends.
It is clear from the fact that Vi is a random sum and
the form of ci,j,l (see (7)) that the distribution of Vi is not
readily obtained in closed-form. As such, we instead adopt a
principled approach to approximating Vi, which is based on
an Askey-orthogonal polynomial expansion. In particular, we
use the Jacobi polynomials since the support of the income
Vi is bounded on [−vi,min, vi,max]. This follows from the fact
that both τi,j and ci,j,l are bounded.
It is important to note that the Jacobi polynomials are only
orthogonal on [−1, 1]. Hence, we need to transform Vi so
that it has also has support [−1, 1]. This is achieved via the
transformation
Wi =
2(Vi + vi,min)
vi,max + vi,min
− 1, (19)
where vi,min = −cminTρ and vi,max = icmaxTρ, from (18).
The distribution of Wi via the Jacobi polynomial represen-
tation is then given by [20]
fWi(x) ≈ K(x)
d∑
m=0
amP
(a,b)
m (x), (20)
where d is the order of the approximation, P (a,b)m (x) is the
m-th Jacobi poynomial with parameters a, b, am is given by
an =
B(a, b)(2n+ a+ b− 1)Γ(n+ a+ b− 1)n!
Γ(n+ a)Γ(n+ b)
×
∫ 1
−1
fWi(x)P
(a,b)
n (x)dx
= bn
∫ 1
−1
fWi(x)P
(a,b)
n (x)dx, (21)
and K(x) is given by
K(x) =
(1 + x)a−1(1 − x)b−1
B(a, b)2a+b−1
, (22)
where
B(x, y) = Γ(x)Γ(y)/Γ(x + y). (23)
We note that the coefficients an minimize the mean square
error between the approximation and fWi(x) as d→∞.
Remark 3. From extensive numerical experiments, we have
found that the choice a = b = 1 (corresponding to Legendre
polynomials) yields the most accurate approximations for a
range of moments (corresponding to different network setups).
As P (a,b)n is a polynomial, we can write an as
an = bn
∫ 1
−1
fWi(x)
n∑
s=0
ζn,sx
s = bn
n∑
s=0
ζn,sE[W
s
i ], (24)
where ζn,s corresponds to the coefficient of the s-th order term
of P (a,b)n . This means that the approximation is completely
characterized by the raw moments of Wi. Observe that the
moments of Wi are related to the moments of Vi via
E[W si ] = E
[(
2(Vi + vi,min)
vi,max + vi,min
− 1
)s]
, (25)
which can be readily evaluated (given the moments of Vi) via
the binomial expansion.
Remark 4. To obtain the moments of Vi (and hence the mo-
ments of Wi), we compute and then differentiate the moment
generating function, which allows us to use the probability
generating functional of the PPP; surpassing the need to ex-
plicitly derive the distribution of the interference. The moments
and details of the derivations are given in Appendix A.
The distribution of Vi is then obtained from the distribution
of Wi via the transformation
fVi(x) =
2
vi,max + vi,min
fWi
(
2(x+ vi,min)
vi,max + vi,min
− 1
)
, (26)
where fWi(x) is given by (20). We summarize the procedure
in Algorithm 2.
C. Recursion for the Net Profit PDF
The second stage is to compute the PDF of the net profit.
Recall from Definition 3, that the net profit for time slot i is
given by
Snet(i) =
Ni∑
j=1
[v(τi,j , ci,j)− C(τi,j , ki,j)] . (27)
8Algorithm 2 Orthogonal Polynomial Basis Expansion of the
Net Profit PDF
1. Compute the moments of Vi using (60) and (61) in Ap-
pendix A.
2. Transform Vi to the random variable Wi with support
[−1, 1] via (19).
3. Compute the basis expansion coefficients an via (24).
4. Compute the basis expansion of fWi(x) using (20).
5. Transform fWi(x) via (26) to obtain fVi(x).
It is important to note that Snet(i) has a different distribution
for each i (see Remark 2). Moreover, observe that the distri-
bution of C(τi,j , ki,j) is discrete and the approximation of the
distribution of v(τi,j , ci,j) from Section IV-B is continuous
(with bounded support). Also note that Snet(i) is a random
sum (in both the summands and number of summands).
As such, it is not straightforward to efficiently compute the
distribution of Snet(i).
Fortunately, linear recursions have been developed to eval-
uate distributions for sums closely related to Snet(i). In order
to apply these recursive approaches, we first need to find
the distribution of v(τi,j , ci,j) after it has been discretized.
The discretization of v(τi,j , ci,j) can be obtained via standard
approaches such as the Lloyd algorithm [21]; although it
is important to carefully consider any negative terms in the
distribution of v(τi,j , ci,j) that might occur due to the basis
expansion approximation. We denote the discretization as
vˆ(τi,j , ci,j).
To obtain the PDF of the net profit, denoted by hZj , we
now embed the discretized income into the lattice ∆Z by
choosing ∆ > 0 sufficiently small and rounding the support
of vˆ(τi,j , ci,j). We then obtain the distribution
hZj (k) = Pr(Zj = k), (28)
of the random quantity
Zj = [vˆ(τi,j , ci,j)− C(τi,j , ki,j)] , (29)
by convolving the (discrete) distributions of Vˆ = vˆ(τi,j , ci,j)
and C(τi,j , ki,j), which both have discrete support on S ⊂
∆Z, with |S| <∞.
At this point, we obtain the approximate distribution of
Snet(i). This is based on the following linear recurrence based
on [17, Eq. (1.7)],
fSnet(i)((n+ 1)∆)
=
wN
1− wNhZi(0)
×
∞∑
k=−∞, k 6=−1
(n+ 1)hZi((k + 1)∆)fSnet(i)((n− k)∆).
(30)
We note that similar difference equations can be derived
for distributions of Ni, other than geometric; in fact, it is
straightforward to extend to any distribution in the Katz family
(i.e., binomial, Poisson, and negative binomial distributions).
Further details may be found in [17, Eq. (1.3)] and [22, Eq.
(1)].
Remark 5. We emphasize that the support of Snet(i) is over
Z, not just N. This means that the standard recursion in [22]
(known as the Panjer recursion) is not applicable; the more
general approach in [17] is required.
In practice, the sum (30) is in fact bounded (due to the finite
resolution of the discretization step), which gives
fSnet(i)((n+ 1)∆)
=
wN
1− wNhZi(0)
×
kmax∑
k=kmin, k 6=−1
(n+ 1)hZi((k + 1)∆)fSnet(i)((n− k)∆),
(31)
where3 kmin = min Supp(Snet(i)) − 1 and kmax =
maxSupp(Snet(i)) − 1, depend on the discretization resolu-
tion.
In order to solve the linear recurrence relation in (31), we
use a convex reformulation in terms of a least squares problem,
min
f : fT f=1
‖Af‖2, (32)
where A consists of the coefficients in terms of hZi from (31)
and f is the distribution of Snet(i). We note that in principle
other objectives can be used in (32), such as those discussed
in [17]; however, we have found via numerical experiments
that the least squares objective is suitable for the purpose of
approximating the ruin probability.
D. Recursion for the Probability of Ruin
The third (and final) stage of the calculation is to compute
the probability of ruin. This is achieved by collecting the
distributions of Snet(l) and substituting into the new ruin
probability recursion, which we derive in this section.
It is important to note that the ruin probability (defined
in Definition 5) is the probability that the revenue surplus is
negative at any l ≤ L. Formally, the ruin probability can be
written as
ψL(u) = Pr(S1(u) < 0 ∪ · · · ∪ SL(u) < 0). (33)
It is helpful to write the ruin probability in terms of the survival
probability (see Definition 5), which is given by
φL(u) = 1− ψL(u) = Pr(S1 ≥ 0 ∩ · · · ∩ SL ≥ 0). (34)
We now give the recursion for the probability of ruin in
terms of the distributions of Snet(l), l = 1, 2, . . . , L. First,
define
Gl(y) = Pr(Snet(l) ≤ y). (35)
We then have the following theorem, which generalizes the
ruin probability recursion in [18], [23].
3The set Supp(Snet(i)) corresponds to the support of Snet(i).
9Theorem 1. The survival probability after L time periods
(e.g., months) is given by
φL(u) = φL−1(u)(1 −GL(0))
+
∫ 0
−∞
φL−1
(
u+
y
(1 + r)L
)
dGL(y), ∀L ≥ 2,
(36)
where
φ1(u) = 1−G1(−u(1 + r)). (37)
The ruin probability is then obtained via ψL(u) = 1−φL(u).
Proof: See Appendix B.
We note that the integral in Theorem 1 is a Stieltjes integral.
This is important as Gl, l = 1, 2, . . . , L is in fact a sequence
of distributions, all with discrete and bounded support. As
such, the Stieltjes integral is a finite sum and can be efficiently
evaluated numerically.
V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
With our evaluation framework based on ruin-theory in
hand, we now turn to evaluating facility network sharing. We
obtain pricing schemes that yield a probability of ruin less
than 10%, under practical operating conditions. Along the
way, we present important tradeoffs between physical layer
resources such as pathloss, and financial constraints such as
initial capital, interest rate (compounded monthly) and pricing.
Before evaluating the ruin probability using the techniques
we have developed in Section IV, we first present a simplified
analysis based purely on the expected revenue surplus (see
Definition 3). This analysis provides initial insights into the
financial aspects of the problem, which may be unfamiliar to
the wireless communication community. That is, we consider
E[Snet(l)] = u(1 + r)
l +
l∑
i=1
(1 + r)l−iE[N ] (E[V ]− E[C]) ,
(38)
where we assume that the connection duration time τi,j is
constant, which means that the revenue per user Vi has ex-
pectation E[V ] for all i. The condition on the initial capital to
ensure positive average revenue surplus (i.e., E[Snet(l)] ≥ 0)
at a given time n for interest rate r is then given by
u ≥ E[N ] (E[C]− E[V ])
(
(1 + r)n − 1
r(1 + r)n
)
. (39)
To illustrate this condition, Fig. 2 plots the expected revenue
E[V ] versus the bound on u; each curve corresponding to a
different time slot n. First, observe the initial capital needs
to be non-zero to ensure a positive expected revenue surplus
when the costs exceed the revenue; i.e., E[C] > E[V ]. Second,
observe that there is a diminishing increase in the required
initial capital as the number of time steps is increased; this
can be seen by comparing the gaps between the curves, for
a fixed E[V ]. Moreover, as the bound on u in (39) scales
linearly with E[N ], the initial capital increases significantly as
the number of connected users increase, when E[C] > E[V ].
These are general trends; however, it is important to note the
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Fig. 2. Plot of bound on initial capital u to ensure E[Snet(l)] ≥ 0, where
r = 0.05,E[N ] = 100,E[C] = 0.1.
limitations of any analysis based on expected revenue surplus.
In particular, short-term behavior of the revenue surplus is not
accounted for, which has the consequence that fluctuations
in user demand or available network resources can cause the
revenue surplus to drop below zero—leading to ruin. As such,
it is necessary to use our framework based on ruin theory
to account for these fluctuations and ultimately reduce the
financial risk to the facility.
To account for fluctuations in the revenue surplus, we now
turn to our evaluation framework based on ruin theory. We
consider the network setup in Table I and define Ad =
2R
(1)/B − 1, where R(1) is the rate product on offer.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NETWORK PARAMETERS.
Parameter K σ2 P0 = PI wN Q Tρ C κT
Value 1 0 1 0.2 1 1 100 1 month
We first consider the moments of the revenue E[V ]. These
moments are ultimately used to compute the probability of
ruin. They are also of interest in their own right. We show
this next by examining the role of the key wireless network
and financial parameters α, β, cmin, and cmax.
In Table II, we compare the small-cell density β with the
first moment of V , E[V ], obtained numerically via (61) and
via Monte Carlo simulation. We point out that the moments
obtained numerically via (61) are in good agreement with the
moments obtained via Monte Carlo simulation. Importantly,
the moment E[V ] is constant irrespective of the small-cell
density for both the numerical and Monte Carlo approaches.
This suggests that the small-cell density does not play an
important role in networks well-modeled by PPPs. We believe
the reason for this is that as the density of small-cells increases,
there is an increase in nearby interfering small-cells, which is
balanced by a closer servicing small-cell. Note that the small-
cell density has a similar effect of outage probability in the
10
TABLE II
TABLE SHOWING EFFECT OF VARYING SMALL-CELL DENSITY β , FOR DIFFERENT PATHLOSS EXPONENT α USING NUMERICAL (NUM.) AND MONTE
CARLO (M.C.) APPROACHES. EVALUATION PERFORMED WITH cmin = 0.1, cmax = 100, Ad = 100.
β E[V ] Num., α = 3 E[V ] M.C., α = 3 E[V ] Num., α = 4 E[V ] M.C., α = 4
0.01 76.5 75.5 60.5 60.2
0.1 76.5 77.0 60.5 60.9
1 76.5 76.4 60.5 59.8
low noise region, as shown in [19].
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Fig. 3. Plot of expected revenue E[V ] versus pathloss exponent α, with
varying Ad = 2R
(1)/B − 1. Parameters are β = 0.1, cmin = 0.1, cmax =
100, Ad = 100.
Next, we consider the effect of the pathloss on the revenue.
Fig. 3 plots the pathloss exponent versus the expected revenue
E[V ], which shows excellent agreement between our numeri-
cal result (based on (61)) and Monte Carlo results. The trend
illustrated by the figure is that the revenue decreases as the
pathloss exponent increases, irrespective of Ad (corresponding
to different rate products R(1) on offer). This is due to the fact
that it is easier to service users with a high pathloss exponent
as it means that there are often lower interference levels.
Following Algorithm 1, the next step to compute the ruin
probability is to obtain the PDF of the revenue V via basis
expansion. To illustrate this step, the basis expansion approx-
imation for the CDF of V is plotted in Fig. 4. We observe
that our numerical approximation is in good agreement for
revenue less than 200, and then has small oscillations for high
revenue values. It is important to note that tail oscillations
are common when using the Jacobi polynomial representation,
and must be carefully accounted for. In the setup for Fig. 4,
the approximation is good; however, as cmin is increased or
cmax decreased, the discontinuity affects the quality of the
approximation. As such, additional moments (i.e., E[V 5],..)
are required to smooth the oscillations, which can be obtained
easily from our analysis in Appendix A. We also note that the
parameters a, b in the Jacobi polynomials (see Section IV-B)
strongly influence the approximation; extensive numerical
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Fig. 4. Plot of basis expansion approximation for the CDF of V using four
moments. Parameters are α = 4, β = 0.1, cmin = 0.001, cmax = 1000,
Ad = 100.
experiments suggest that a = b = 1 is a robust choice.
Table III shows the ruin probability after 5 months versus
the initial capital u, for varying Ad (reflecting different rate
products on offer). As expected from Fig. 2, in order to obtain
a low probability of ruin, the initial capital needs to be chosen
carefully. This is reflected in both the numerical and Monte
Carlo results. We note that for low (u = 100) and high (u ≥
250) initial capital, the numerical and Monte Carlo approaches
are in agreement. However, for u ≈ 200, there is a difference
of approximately 0.1. This is due to the discretization step
detailed in Section IV-C. Importantly, to ensure the probability
of ruin is less than approximately 10%, an initial capital of
u > 250 is required, with the parameters used in Table III.
TABLE III
RUIN PROBABILITY AFTER 5 MONTHS WITH VARYING INITIAL CAPITAL u.
PARAMETERS ARE α = 4, β = 0.1, cmin = 0.001, cmax = 1000,
Ad = 100, AND r = 0.05.
Initial Capital u 100 150 200 250 300
Numerical (Using Theorem 1) 0.33 0.09 0.01 0 0
Monte Carlo 0.33 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.02
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Due to the recent availability of cheap small-cells and the
unique operating requirements of facilities, there is a need
for alternative network sharing arrangements. To this end, we
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proposed a facility network sharing arrangement, which is
based on: a leasing agreement between traditional operators
and the facility; and a service agreement between users and
the facility. Unlike traditional operators, the local scale of
facilities means that technical design at the level of the network
architecture is intimately connected with the profitability;
instead of loosely coupled.
In order to evaluate our facility network sharing arrange-
ment, we adopted a socio-technical system design approach.
As such, our key performance metric is the ruin probability—
leading to a new ruin-based evaluation framework. To evaluate
the ruin probability, we proposed a numerical approximation
method, which is shown to be in good agreement with Monte
Carlo simulation. Our approximation method includes two key
novel aspects: computation of the moments of the revenue
via stochastic geometry techniques; and a new recursion
for the ruin probability, which is tailored for the wireless
communication setting. Our numerical results suggested that
there are in fact concrete conditions where profitable operation
of facilities is possible, with sufficient initial capital.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we derive the moments of the income for
a user with connection ending in time slot i, which is used
to compute the ruin probability. Importantly, our analysis can
be straightforwardly extended to higher moments. Recall that
the income from a single user (a typical node, by Slivnyak’s
theorem for homogeneous Poisson point processes) is given
by
v(τi,j , ci,j) =
τi,j∑
l=1
ci,j,lTρ, (40)
where the scaling factor is
ci,j,l = max
{
min
{(
2Ri,j/B − 1
)
PIIi,j,l
|hi,j,l|2d
−α
i,j P0
, cmax
}
, cmin
}
.
(41)
We also define: A = PI(2
Ri,j/B−1)
P0d
−α
i,j
; Hl = |hi,j,l|2; τ = τi,j ;
and V = v(τi,j , ci,j).
In order to compute the four moments, we require the
moment generating function (MGF) of V . In turn, the MGF
is obtained from the Laplace transform LX(t), which is given
by
LV (t) = E
[
exp
(
−t
τ∑
l=1
max
{
min
{
AIl
Hl
, cmax
}
, cmin
}
Tρ
)]
= Eτ
[
EA
[(
EHl,Il
[
exp
(
−t
× max
{
min
{
AIl
Hl
, cmax
}
, cmin
}
Tρ
)∣∣∣∣A
])τ ∣∣∣∣τ
]]
.
(42)
Note that Ri,j and τ have discrete support, so these expec-
tations are sums we evaluate last. We now evaluate the inner
expectation over the interference I and the channel gain Hl.
Observe that the inner expectation can be written as
E(t) = EHl,Il
[
exp
(
−tmax
{
min
{
AIl
Hl
, cmax
}
, cmin
}
× Tρ)
∣∣∣∣A, τ
]
= E1(t) + E2(t) + E3(t), (43)
where
E1(t) = E
[
e−tTρcmin
∣∣∣∣AIlHl < cmin
]
Pr
(
AIl
Hl
< cmin
)
= e−tTρcminPr
(
AIl
Hl
< cmin
)
,
E2(t) = e
−tTρcmaxPr
(
AIl
Hl
> cmax
)
,
E3(t) = E
[
e
−tTρ
AIl
Hl
∣∣∣∣cmin ≤ AIlHl ≤ cmax
]
× Pr
(
cmin ≤
AIl
Hl
≤ cmax
)
=
∫ cmax
cmin
e−tTρwfW (w)dw, (44)
with
W =
AIl
Hl
. (45)
To compute E3(t), observe that
Pr(W ≤ w) = EIl
[
e−
AIl
w
]
⇒ fW (w) = EIl
[
AIl
w2
e−
AIl
w
]
.
(46)
Hence,
E3(t) = EIl
[∫ cmax
cmin
e−tTρw
AIl
w2
e−
AIl
w dw
]
. (47)
Next, we integrate by parts to obtain
E(t) = E1(t) + E2(t) + E3(t)
= e−tTρcmax + tT ρ
∫ 1
cmin
1
cmax
1
u2
e−tTρ/uEIl
[
e−AIlu
]
du.
(48)
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In order to compute E(t), we require EI [e−AIlu], which is
given by
EIl
[
e−AIlu
] (a)
= EX ,{gm}

 ∏
m∈X\{b0}
e−Augmr
−α
m


(b)
= EX

 ∏
m∈X\{b0}
Eg
[
e−Augr
−α
m
]
(c)
= exp
(
−2piβ
∫ ∞
rU
(
1− Eg
[
e−Augz
−α
])
zdz
)
,
(49)
where: (a) follows from Hl ∼ exp(1); (b) follows from the
fact that {gm} is independent of the spatial point process; and
(c) follows from the probability generating functional of the
PPP4.
Continuing, we have
EIl
[
e−AIlu
]
= exp
(
−2piβ
∫ ∞
0
1
α
∫ r−αU
0
(
1− e−Agyu
)
y−
2
α−1dye−gdg
)
,
(50)
which follows from the change of variables y = z−α ⇒ z =
y−1/α ⇒ dz = − 1αy
− 1α−1dy.
Now consider the inner integral in (50), given by
F =
∫ r−αU
0
(
1− e−Agyu
)
y−
2
α−1dy
= −
α
2
(
1− e−Agr
−α
U u
)
r2U +
αAgu
2
F1, (51)
where
F1 =
∫ r−αU
0
e−Agyuy−
2
α dy. (52)
Integrating by parts again we obtain,
F1 =
(
1
Agu
)− 2α+1
γ
(
1−
2
α
,Agur−αU
)
, (53)
where γ(s, x) =
∫ x
0 t
s−1e−tdt.
Next, we compute the outer integral in (50), which is given
by
G =
∫ ∞
0
Fe−gdg = G1 +G2, (54)
where
G1 = −
αr2U
2
∫ ∞
0
(
1− e−Agur
−α
U
)
e−gdg,
G2 =
α
2
(
1
Au
)− 2α ∫ ∞
0
g
2
α e−gγ
(
1−
2
α
,Agur−αU
)
dg.
(55)
4The probability generating functional property of the PPP gives
E[
∏
x∈X f(x)] = e
−β
∫
R2
(1−f(x))dx
.
We now require the identity from [24, Eq. 6.4552],
∫ ∞
0
xµ−1e−βxγ(ν, αx)dx =
ανΓ(µ+ ν)
ν(α+ β)µ+ν
× 2F1
(
1, µ+ ν; ν + 1;
α
α+ β
)
.
(56)
Identifying terms, we obtain
G2 =
α
2
(
1
Au
)− 2α (Aur−αU )1− 2α(
1− 2α
) (
Aur−αU + 1
)2
× 2F1
(
1, 2; 2−
2
α
;
Aur−αU
1 +Aur−αU
)
. (57)
To compute E[e−AIlu], substitute G1 and G2 into (50). This
result is then used to compute the Laplace transform and obtain
the moments via
E[V ni ] = (−1)
n d
nLVi(t)
dtn
|t=0. (58)
All that remains is to explicitly compute the moments. We
define the following terms: E(k)0 (t) is the k-the derivative of
E(t); E(k)0 is the k-the derivative of E(t) evaluated at t =
0; and L(k)0 is the k-th derivative of LX(t) conditioned on
d,Ri,j , τ evaluated at t = 0. Note that E(0) = 1.
Using (48), we have
E(t) = e−tTρcmax + tT ρ
∫ 1
cmin
1
cmax
1
u2
e−tTρ/uEIl
[
e−AIlu
]
du,
E(s)(t) = (−Tρcmax)
se−tTρcmax
+ s(−1)s+1(Tρ)s
∫ 1
cmin
1
cmax
1
us+1
e−tTρ/uEIl
[
e−AIlu
]
du
− t(Tρ)s+1
∫ 1
cmin
1
cmax
1
us+2
e−tTρ/uEIl
[
e−AIlu
]
du,
(59)
where E(s)(t) is the s-th derivative of E(t) and E[e−AIlu] is
given by (50).
Now, let 1 denote the indicator function. The moments
conditioned on di,j , Ri,j , τi,j can now be readily obtained. We
illustrate with the first conditional moment.
L
(1)
0 = τE
(1)
0 1τ>0. (60)
Finally, the moments for the revenue from a user with
connection ending in time slot i are given by
E[V ki ] =
n∑
l=1
Q∑
k=1
Pr(Ri,j = k)Pr(τ = l)
∫ ∞
0
L
(k)
0 e
−piβz22piβzdz,
(61)
which can be efficiently evaluated numerically.
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APPENDIX B
Proof of Theorem 1: First (from (34)), observe that the
survival probability can be written as
φn(u) = Pr
(
u(1 + r)n + Snet(n) +
n−1∑
i=1
Snet(i)(1 + r)
n−i ≥ 0,
. . . , u(1 + r) + Snet(1) ≥ 0) . (62)
Also recall that
Gn(y) = Pr(Snet(n) ≤ y). (63)
Now, using (34) and (63) yields φ1(u) = Pr(Snet(1) ≥
−u(1 + r)) = 1−G1(−u(1 + r)). We then have for n ≥ 2
φn(u) = Pr
(
u(1 + r)n−1 +
Snet(n)
1 + r
+
n−1∑
i=1
Snet(i)(1 + r)
n−1−i ≥ 0, . . .
)
= φn−1(u)(1 −Gn(0))
+
∫ 0
−∞
φn−1
(
u+
y
(1 + r)n
)
dGn(y), (64)
which follows after considering{
u(1 + r)n−1 +
Snet(n)
1 + r
+
n−1∑
i=1
Snet(i)(1 + r)
n−1−i ≥ 0
∩u(1 + r)n−1 +
n−1∑
i=1
Snet(i)(1 + r)
n−1−i ≥ 0
}
. (65)
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